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Abstract 
We examine the consequences of imposing higher capital requirements on banks (as under 
Basel III or, recently, in the case of large banks in the European context) for bank dynamics 
in complying with the new standards and for the long-term effects on bank lending rates and 
the demand for bank credit. The analysis combines econometric estimations of the 
determinants of equity capital ratios and lending rates with simulations of market equilibrium 
results for loan interest rates and the demand for bank credit, based on a parameterised 
model of the Spanish banking industry. We find that the gap between the target and the 
actual capital ratio is reduced by around 40% every year, mainly with retained earnings. We 
also find that raising the equity capital ratio by one percentage point increases bank lending 
rates by 4.2 basis points. Finally, the simulation exercise shows that the estimated increase 
in the cost of funds for banks associated with a one percentage point increase in the equity 
capital ratio leads to a fall of 0.8% in the total demand for bank credit. These results suggest 
that the social costs of higher equity capital requirements for banks are expected to be 
greater in the transition period, when banks are adjusting to the new standards, than in the 
steady state of the new industry equilibrium, when all banks comply with the new ratio.     
Keywords: Bank capital regulation, Basel III, bank lending rates, demand for credit. 
JEL Classification: D24, G21. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Este trabajo analiza las consecuencias de un aumento de los requerimientos de capital a los 
bancos (tal como en Basilea III o en la nueva normativa europea dirigida a los grandes bancos) 
tanto en el corto plazo, esto es, en la dinámica del ajuste de los bancos para cumplir con  
los nuevos estándares, como en el largo plazo. El análisis combina las estimaciones 
econométricas basadas en modelos sobre los determinantes de los ratios de capital y de los 
tipos de interés del crédito bancario con mediciones del impacto en el equilibrio a largo plazo 
en los tipos de interés y en la demanda de crédito bancario, obtenidas a partir de simulaciones 
basadas en las estimaciones de un modelo paramétrico para el sector bancario español.  
Los resultados indican que la brecha entre los ratios de capital actuales respecto a los nuevos 
requerimientos se cerrará con un reducción progresiva del 40% anual, principalmente 
mediante la retención de beneficios. Adicionalmente, el trabajo permite concluir que un 
aumento de un punto porcentual del ratio de capital se traduce en un aumento de 4.2 puntos 
básicos en los tipos de interés de los préstamos bancarios. Finalmente, el ejercicio de 
simulación predice que el aumento estimado en el coste de la financiación bancaria asociado a 
un aumento de un punto porcentual en el ratio de capital implica, a largo plazo, una 
disminución de la demanda agregada de crédito bancario del 0,8%. Estos resultados sugieren 
que el coste social del reforzamiento de los requerimientos de capital sería potencialmente 
mayor en el corto plazo, durante el periodo de transición, que en el largo plazo, una vez que 
los bancos han adoptado los nuevos estándares. 
Palabras claves: Regulación del capital bancario, Basilea III, tipos de interés del crédito, 
demanda de crédito. 
Códigos JEL: D24, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
The standards on minimum capital ratios play an important role in banking regulation.1 The 
financial crisis has evidenced some weaknesses in the existing capital regulation and changes 
are under way (new regulation of large banks in the EU and under Basel III) aimed at 
increasing the minimum equity capital ratios for banks2. Equity capital is the most effective 
loss-absorption financial instrument at banks. Thus, the social benefits of higher equity capital 
are in the form of financial stability and more sustained economic growth. However, higher 
equity capital requirements can also have social costs if, for example, banks meet the  
new equity capital requirements by lending less and/or by charging higher interest rates on 
the loans they do grant. There have been some recent estimates of the optimal (welfare-
maximising) regulatory equity capital for banks3, while other research focuses separately on 
the costs or benefits of the regulatory initiative4. This paper addresses the potential costs 
arising from higher regulatory equity capital and provides empirical evidence from Spanish 
banks on how cross-bank differences and  changes over time in equity capital affect the 
interest rate and the aggregate demand for bank loans.  
The paper is structured following Kashyap et al. (2010) and Hanson et al. (2011), 
who make the distinction between what they call the flow and the stock costs of higher equity 
capital regulation. The flow costs emerge in the transition period, when banks with  
equity capital ratios complying with the old regulation standards must find ways to move to 
the higher equity capital ratios set by the new regulation. The stock costs are those occurring 
in the steady state, when banks already comply with the equity capital standards.  
The social component of the flow costs of higher equity capital regulation stems from 
the possibility that banks decide to meet the new ratio by contracting the volume of credit, in 
order to reduce the absolute requirements for additional equity, instead of by increasing the 
volume of equity (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). The inclination of banks to reduce the volume 
of credit in response to the new regulation can be explained by the pecking-order theory of 
finance; according to this, information asymmetries between the existing and new 
shareholders make issuing new shares to raise equity capital particularly expensive (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). The alternative is to obtain additional equity from retained earnings, but this 
way it may take some time for the bank to reach the target ratio. In this paper, we model  
the adjustment of the equity ratio of Spanish banks towards a target ratio to examine  
whether the adjustment is gradual and to test whether the changes in banks’ equity capital 
will be positively correlated with their profits (retained earnings), as predicted by the pecking-
                                                                          
1. See for example Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Brunnermeier, et al. (2009). 
2. Under Basel II, the minimum core equity capital (retained earnings and share issues) is 2% of the risk-weighted  
assets of the bank. Under Basel III, the minimum ratio is 7% or 8.5% under certain conditions. Regulation sets a  
timetable of progressive compliance with the new standards; for the new rules in banks’ regulatory capital see 
www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1. 
3. Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano (2011) explicitly calculate the socially optimal ratio of equity capital for banks from the 
condition of equality between the estimated marginal social benefit and marginal social cost of equity finance. See also 
BIS (2010a, 2010 b and 2010c).  
4. Admati, De Marzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) provide a very comprehensive review of the debate surrounding the 
determinants of the cost of funds for banks. They also revise the arguments about the presumed consequences of 
higher regulatory equity capital for the cost of capital for banks and for banks’ credit decisions. Kashyap, Stein and 
Hanson (2010) examine in detail the literature on the chain of effects from shocks in the equity capital of banks to  
the responses of the real sector of the economy; Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) rely on the previous paper to justify 
reforms in macro-prudential regulation of banks. Elliot (2010) simulates the likely consequences of changes in  
equity capital ratios for the cost of capital for banks. The results are consistent with those in other referenced papers.   
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order theory. Support for this hypothesis would justify the regulatory concern over the flow 
costs of asking banks for more equity capital and  finding the best way (i.e. gradually or 
instantly) of meeting the new standard.  
The second piece of empirical evidence focuses on the stock costs and provides 
estimates of the relationship between bank lending rates and equity capital ratios, relying also 
on data from Spanish banks. The empirical model is similar to that of Kashyap et al. (2010), 
which focuses on the US banking industry, drawing on aggregate data. A differential 
characteristic of our empirical model is that it is estimated using bank-level data. This proves 
to be relevant since we obtain meaningful results that can be interpreted under the 
conceptual framework of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem with taxes. Finally, based 
on a simulation approach, the paper predicts the long-run effect of a permanent increase in 
the cost of funds for banks on the long-term demand for bank credit. These predictions are 
based on simulations using a parameterised model of the Spanish banking industry that 
allows for competition among banks and also between bank credit and other sources of 
funds to finance investment (Martín-Oliver, 2010).  
In recent times, there has been renewed interest in the effects of equity capital on 
bank credit (Berger et al., 2006; Francis and Osborne, 2009; Berrospide and Edge, 2010; 
Adrian and Shin, 2010; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler and Karadia, 2011; Hernando and 
Villanueva, 2012; Aiyar et al., 2012 )5. The empirical papers provide estimates of the effect of 
a marginal change in the equity capital ratio on the growth rate of loans. Our approach is 
different in two main respects. First, we focus on the permanent, long-term effects of a higher 
equity capital ratio for all banks, so we estimate the predicted contraction in the equilibrium 
stock of bank credit, not the effect on the growth rate of bank loans. Second, we obtain the 
results from the demand side of the credit market, not from the supply of credit by banks.  
We find evidence that Spanish banks adjust their equity capital gradually to meet an 
unobservable target equity capital ratio. We also find that the magnitude of the adjustment in 
a given period increases with the lagged amount of the bank’s profits. These results support 
the existence of hidden costs of adjustment in the period of transition from the current to the 
desired levels of the equity capital ratio. Evidence supports the fact that these costs are of  
the kind anticipated by the pecking-order theory (gradual contributions from retained earnings 
are preferred to instant compliance by issuing new shares). We also find that, for Spanish 
banks, higher equity capital ratios entail higher bank lending rates of a magnitude compatible 
with that expected under the Modigliani and Miller theorem in the presence of market 
frictions, such as taxes. Finally, the simulation exercise yields results on the effect of the cost 
of funds on the equilibrium lending rates and on the volume of demand for bank loans that are 
consistent with those found using the econometric approach. The simulation exercise 
provides a robustness check of the econometric results and it has the advantage over the 
latter that the equilibrium values of the demand for bank loans arising from an increase in  
the cost of bank finance are obtained taking into account that, in addition to the interest on 
loans, banks can adjust other competitive variables, such as the number of branches and 
advertising expenditure, in response to the increase in costs.  
 
                                                                          
5. This avenue of research goes back to the early 1990s when there was a debate on whether the adoption of Basel II 
could create a credit contraction in the US (Hancock and Wilcox 1993, 1994, Berger and Udell, 1994, Bernanke and 
Lown 1991, Peek and Rosengren 1995). 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic theory on 
the costs stemming from increases in the equity capital of banks in the dynamic and the static 
steady state situations, as well as the empirical models that can be used to test the 
predictions. Section 3 contains a description of the database and the main variables used in 
the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results drawn from the econometric 
estimations and the simulation exercise. Finally, the conclusions highlight the main results and 
their relevance.  
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2 Theory and empirical models on the potential costs of higher equity capital 
ratios in banks.  
In this section, we briefly discuss the theory behind the determinants of the cost of funds for 
banks and the links between this cost and the interest rate and volume of bank credit. In the 
exposition, we first recall the theories on the determinants of the cost of capital for firms as a 
function of their financial structure and, next, we describe the model of the banking industry 
used in the simulation exercise.  
2.1 Financial structure and cost of equity capital for banks 
How does the cost of capital of a firm vary in response to changes in its financial structure? In 
the case of regulatory equity capital of banks, what is the foreseeable cost of raising the 
minimum equity capital requirements? Kashyap et al (2010) answer these questions making a 
distinction between the flow and the stock costs from higher equity capital requirements. In 
each case, there are private and social components of the costs. The flow costs emerge  
in the transition period, associated to the actions taken by banks to close the gap between 
their actual equity ratio and the new regulatory one, such as issuing new shares or increasing 
retained earnings. The origin of the flow costs is the information asymmetry between firms  
and investors, which causes that the markets interpret the issuance of new shares as a 
negative signal about the situation of the bank and, thus, it will penalize such action with lower 
stock prices (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The social component of the flow cost would be the 
contraction in bank credit and the loss of investment opportunities, if banks respond to  
the higher equity capital requirements by constraining credit growth, and reject funding 
projects with positive NPV (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).   
The stock costs of increasing equity capital of banks refer to the costs of operating 
permanently with an equity capital ratio higher than prior the regulatory change. The new 
financial structure of the bank includes relatively more equity than the old one. This implies, 
if the cost of equity is higher than the cost of debt that the weighted cost of all funds will 
increase. Banks will translate the higher cost of funds into higher interest rates of loans, 
which will contract the demand of bank credit, and, possibly the investment rate of the 
economy (social part of the stock costs). The private part of the stock costs, i.e. the effect 
on banks’ profits of higher weighted cost of capital, will depend on the competitive 
conditions of the market. 
The diagnosis of the magnitude and economic relevance of the stock costs of higher 
equity capital requirements depends very much on whether the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
theorem holds for banks or not. This theorem states that in frictionless markets the weighted 
cost of debt and equity is independent of the proportions of debt and equity in the financial 
structure. Miller (1995) extends the result to the case of banks.  
Debt is less costly than equity because the former is more protected from the 
economic risks of the business than equity (residual claimant). But the cost of equity 
increases with leverage because higher leverage implies more financial risk for the 
shareholders. In the steady state situation of higher equity capital, the same economic risk in 
the assets of the bank is spread into more units of equity than in the situation of lower equity 
finance. For this reason, the risk per unit of equity is proportionally reduced with lower debt 
and, consequently, the risk premium on the cost of equity decreases. At the end, the 
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increment in cost from the substitution of debt by additional equity (more expensive) in the 
less leveraged financial structure, is exactly compensated with the reduction in the cost of 
equity compared with the cost in the more leveraged situation. Nonetheless, the corporate 
tax advantage of debt and information asymmetries between managers and shareholders 
broke down the assumption of frictionless markets and favour debt with respect to equity 
increasing the stock costs of equity finance. Lower expected costs of financial distress, on 
the other hand, compensate part or all of the debt advantage from market frictions.  
The empirical model on adjustment of equity capital by banks 
An unanticipated regulatory change asking for an immediately higher equity capital ratio for 
banks or a negative external shock that causes higher expected present and future losses 
can take banks to an undercapitalized situation. The valuation of the social costs of 
undercapitalized banks requires tracing how this situation influences credit availability, 
investment and economic growth. The complete and detailed examination of this issue is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. What we will do next, in the empirical section, is to 
test the hypothesis of the “pecking order theory” of finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984), build 
under the assumption of information asymmetries between insiders and investors, which 
results in penalties for firms that try to close the gap between the current and the target equity 
capital ratio by issuing new shares. This penalty or flow cost of meeting higher equity capital 
requirements could be minimized by a gradual increase in equity from internal sources of 
funds, such as retained earnings. We will check whether banks adjust their equity capital ratio 
instantly or gradually and if the speed of adjustment is positively correlated with the level of 
profits (as a proxy of earning retentions). We obtain evidence of positive flow costs when 
asking for higher equity capital.  
To find out evidence of flow costs associated to raising equity among Spanish 
banks, we rely on a partial adjustment model of the equity capital ratio of banks towards the 
target equity ratio, as in Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994), Flannery and Rangan (2008) and 
Berrospide and Edge (2010). The partial adjustment equation is formulated as:  
  1,,* 1,,1,   tititititi KEKEKEKE   (1) 
where itKE  and 
*
itKE  denote the observed and the equilibrium target equity capital 
ratios of bank i in year t, respectively; 1, ti  denotes the error term and parameter λ measure 
the speed of adjustment to the target level. We assume that the target ratio is a function of a 
vector of observable characteristics of the bank, Xit:  
 
titi XKE ,
*
1,   (2) 
Substituting in (2), we obtain the empirical formulation of the model on the 
determinants of the equity capital of banks: 
  1tititi1ti XKE1KE   ,,,,   (3) 
The variables included in vector Xit varies across studies but, in general, they will be 
proxy variables for the costs and benefits of holding different levels of capital ratios, including 
corporate taxation, costs of financial distress and bankruptcy, transaction costs and 
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asymmetric information problems, and so on. In this paper, our interest is in testing the 
prediction of the pecking order theory that the equity ratio of banks varies positively with  
the level of current profits, as determinants of retained earnings. Therefore, the main 
explanatory variable of the equity capital ratio will be the return on assets of the bank, ROA. 
The rest of control variables, such as, risk, growth opportunities and size will be described  
in the empirical section.  
The long run effects of higher equity 
Once the equity capital ratio reaches the steady state situation, the market frictions that force 
a departure from the Modigliani and Miller theorem are the deductibility of interests of debt in 
the corporate tax base, together with the non-deductibility of dividend payments; the agency 
costs from conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders and the positive cost of 
bankruptcy. Corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs imply that there is an optimal leverage 
ratio minimizing the cost of funds that may be different among firms. In the case of banks, the 
social cost of bankruptcy will be much higher, in general, than the private ones perceived by 
bank managers and shareholders, if the latter perceive that banks under distress will be 
rescued by governments. In this case, the leverage decision of bank managers and 
shareholders pursues to maximize the saving in corporate taxes by issuing debt like financial 
instruments, instead of equity to meet regulatory capital requirements.  
The computation of the banks’ corporate tax cost of increasing equity finance to 
substitute debt is straightforward to calculate. If the interest rate of debt is 10% and the 
corporate tax rate is 30%, one additional percentage point of equity (and, therefore one 
percentage point less of debt) will increase the cost of capital in 3 basic points, just the 
amount of additional taxes paid compared with the taxes before the substitution. Kashyap 
et al (2010) add to this tax cost of a less leveraged financial structure two other potential 
sources of cost. One has to do with the difference in cost of long and short term debt due 
to different liquidity premium. The other source of cost is attributed to undefined frictions in 
the markets that cause a departure from the ideal environment of the Modigliani and Miller 
theorem. Overall, for the tax system and the financial market conditions of a country like the 
USA, Kashyap et al (2010) calibrate the increase in the weighted cost of capital for one 
additional percentage point of equity capital in the bank’s financial structure in a range 
between 2.5 and 4.5 basis points6. We consider this calibration as a reasonable starting 
point for Spain, too.  
If banks with higher equity capital ratios pay a higher weighted average cost for the 
funds used to finance loans it can be expected that these banks will charge higher interest 
rates in their loans to compensate for the higher cost. The calibration of the magnitude of the 
cost of higher equity capital ratios provides a reference value for the expected marginal 
increase in the interest of bank loans per unit of the equity capital ratio. The empirical model 
to test for differences in interest rates charged on loans due to differences in the equity capital 
ratios of banks is formulated as follows7: 
                                                                          
6. Kashyap et al (2010) and Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano (2011) explicitly test for the hypothesis of risk conservation, 
which is the basis for the Modigliani and Miller theorem, with data from US and UK banks. The test consists in the 
regression of the “beta” of the stock market returns of banks’ shares against their respective leverage ratios. The data 
confirms that the risk (beta) is positively correlated with leverage and that, if leverage is reduced to one half, then the 
beta and the risk premium on shares’ expected returns are also reduced to half.   
7. Other papers have modelled the relationship between the capital ratio of banks and profit margins (Demirguc¸-Kunt, 
Laeven, and Levine, 2003) or overall economic performance (Berger and di Patti, 2006). For the purpose of our paper the 
relevant result is how equity capital affects the interest of loans since equity capital is part of the cost of funds for the bank. 
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titititi ZKEr ,,,,    (4) 
where rit is the interest rate of loans of bank i in year t, KEit is the equity capital ratio of 
the period, Zit is a vector of control variables (it will be discussed in the empirical section), and 
ηit is the error term. The hypothesis to be tested is that the estimated coefficient of the equity 
capital ratio will be positive and significant. We take as a reference point the calibration of 
Kashyap and Stein (2010), which establishes that the estimated value of α will be in the 
interval [0.025, 0.045], under the assumption that increases in cost of funds are entirely 
translated to the interest rates fixed banks. In precence of an elastic demand of credit, this 
interval can be interpreted as an upper limit.  
2.2 Cost of funds, interest rates and volume of loans in an equilibrium model 
So far, we have explained how we will estimate the likely pace of compliance with the new 
equity capital requirements and the likely effect of the new regulation on the cost of credit 
using banks’ historical data. However, this is only one part of the overall economic and social 
consequences of the new capital regulation. What is missing in this approach is the effect of 
the adjustment process in the volume of aggregate bank credit, investment rate and 
economic growth. Ceteris paribus, higher cost of equity will be translated into higher interest 
rates of loans in proportion to the market power of banks, which is inversely related to their 
respective price elasticity of demand. In a monopolistic competition market for example, a 
bank i with absolute price elasticity of loans equal to eil and a marginal cost of loans of mit in 
period t will quote a profit maximizing loan interest rate, rlit, given by8: 
 it
il
l
it me
r 


 
1
11  (5)
The marginal cost of loans is given by the sum of the financial cost of funds for  
the bank (including the cost of regulatory equity capital), the operating costs incurred in the 
lending process (borrower screening, borrower monitoring and so on), and the credit risk 
premium. If equity capital regulation asks for more equity to back up the loans granted by 
banks and, as a consequence, the financial mix of the portfolio of loans becomes more 
expensive, the translation of the increment in the cost into increment in the interest of  
loans will depend on the market power of the banks.  
However, the calculation of the interest rate as a mark up on marginal cost has some 
limitations. First, since the change in regulatory capital is likely to affect the marginal cost of 
lending for all banks in the economy, then the translation of higher cost to higher interest rates 
of loans will also be generalized. The effect on the aggregate demand of bank credit in 
response of a generalized increase in the interest rate of loans across banks will depend now, 
ceteris paribus, on the price elasticity of the aggregate demand of bank loans, which in turn 
will reflect the substitutability between bank credit and other sources of finance for firms and 
households. Of course, the ceteris paribus assumption may not hold if banks respond to the 
higher cost of funds not only with price increases but with changes in other competition 
variables, such as advertising, customer services or branch network.  
                                                                          
8. The price equation (5) can be easily rearranged to obtain the well-known result: 
l
l
it
it
l
it
er
mr 1 ; that is, the net relative 
profit margin (the so-called Lerner index) is equal to the inverse of the absolute value of the price elasticity. 
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This paper evaluates the final consequence for the demand of bank credit resulting 
from the change in cost of funds after the new capital regulation by simulating the market 
equilibrium solution in a parameterized model of banking competition for the Spanish banking 
industry estimated by Martín-Oliver (2010). In this model, the demand of loans and deposits is 
derived from a multiple choice decision problem using the methodology in Berry (1994)  
and Berry et al. (1995). Each bank offers a product differentiated from the rest of banks, and 
buyers choose the offer that maximizes their respective utility. The consumer’s choice set 
includes what is called the “outside good”, that is, other financing and investing instruments 
that are imperfect substitutes of the bank loans and deposits.  
The introduction of the outside good acknowledges that the demand of loans and 
deposits is part of the overall demand of financial products and it enables to jointly estimate 
the interest elasticity of loans and deposits at the individual-bank level and at the aggregate 
level for the whole banking system. The supply side of the market consists of banks that 
deliver loans and deposits produced at the branch level following a Leontief production 
technology (Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás, 2008), whose inputs are the capacity of the 
branch (quasi-fixed input) and the services from the labour force and the IT capital of  
the branch. Each bank takes profit-maximizing decisions on a wide set of price and non-price 
competition variables: interest rates of loans, interest rates of deposits, number of branches, 
advertising capital, number of employees and information technology (IT); the equilibrium of 
the market is the Nash competitive equilibrium solution.  
The application of the simulation methodology will consist in computing the 
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables, interest rate and demand of bank loans, for 
variations in the marginal cost of lending attributed to variations in the equity capital ratio. 
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3 Database and variables 
The database for the empirical analysis performed in the paper is elaborated from the 
information contained in the balance sheets and income statements, as well as in 
complementary files, reported by individual banks to Banco de España. The sample period 
spans from 1992 to 2007. In year 1993, Spanish banks are regulated under the requirements 
of Basel I (CBE 5/93) for the first time. Basel I regulation remains unchanged for the whole 
period of study since Basel II was first introduced in 2008. Year 2007 coincides with the year 
before the start of the recent financial crisis. The information in the database refers to 
commercial and savings banks. We exclude credit cooperatives because they do not provide 
all the information that is needed in the analysis, as well as banks whose market share of 
assets is smaller than 0.1%. The total number of banks with usable information starts with 
143 in 1992 and 90 in 2007. When two banks merge, we consider that a new bank brand is 
created. Banks considered in our paper cover around 90% of the assets in the Spanish 
banking industry in 2007. This coverage is similar in terms of other variables, such as number 
of employees, loans and deposits, and remains fairly stable across the studied period. 
3.1 Equity capital 
The Equity capital of the bank is calculated as the sum of capital plus reserves from the 
retained earnings. We express this figure in current nominal prices at the end of each year 
applying a permanent inventory model with a zero-depreciation rate and the consumer price 
index as the price inflation variable, as in Martín-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007). The 
reason for doing so is that inflation was relatively high in Spain in the early years of  
the sample. Thus, one euro of equity coming from retained earnings of a given year was not 
comparable with one euro of the unadjusted current stock of equity. By the updating of past 
increments of equity to current units of purchasing power, we have the stock at the end of the 
year valued at homogeneous “prices”. The exercise is repeated with other items of the liability 
side of the balance sheet of banks, for example, deposits. Thus, we have both equity and 
debt of banks at current prices. Then, the equity capital ratio, KE, is calculated dividing 
absolute equity capital by absolute equity and debt, both at current prices. This is the 
dependent variable of model (3).  
The time evolution of descriptive statistics of the equity capital ratio, KE, for the 
banks in the sample is shown in Figure 1A. The three statistics, mean, median and weighted 
average, show a decreasing time trend along the period 1992-2007, although the decline 
accelerates in the second part of the period when Spain becomes a member of the Euro 
zone. Notice that the mean is above the median, indicating the asymmetry of the distribution 
of capital ratios in the population of banks, and that the weighted mean is lower than the un-
weighted one, i.e., the equity capital ratio is inversely related to the size of the bank9.  
Another relevant empirical issue is whether the capital ratios converge or diverge 
over time. To examine it, we present in Figure 1A.B the standard deviation and the 
coefficient of variation of the ratio over time. The observation of this figure indicates  
that the standard deviation of the capital ratio has decreased along the sample period, 
but the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) remains rather 
                                                                          
9. The equity capital ratio calculated with equity and debt at their face values in the balance sheet of banks shows also a 
decreasing trend over time but not so pronounced as the ratio at current prices. The price adjusted equity ratio is higher 
than the accounting one during most of the time period but the two ratios converge at the end of the period. 
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constant over time, with a slight increasing trend beginning at the late 90’s. From these 
results, we conclude that there is no evidence of convergence in the ratio of equity 
capital over time among Spanish banks.  
For comparative purposes, Figure 1B shows the time evolution of descriptive 
statistics on the solvency ratio or regulatory capital ratio of banks10. The solvency ratio11 is 
equal to Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (that includes debt-like securities in addition to capital raised 
by issuing shares and retainer earnings) of the bank divided by the risk weighted assets 
(RWA)12. The solvency ratio remains much more stable over time than the equity ratio, 
specially the median and the weighted average values of the distribution that remain around 
values of 11.5% from 2000 to 2007 (Figure 1B.A). The simple mean of individual banks’ ratios 
is above the weighted mean and above the median values of the distribution, indicating that 
small banks keep on average higher solvency ratios than large banks. However the 
differences are reduced over time, indicating the convergence of solvency ratios among large 
and small banks (Figure 2B).   
3.2 Interest rate of loans 
The other dependent variable in our analysis is the average interest rate on bank loans, 
model (4). The interest rate is calculated as the ratio between the interests from loans charged 
by the bank i in year t and the average of the outstanding loans at the end of year t-1 and t. 
The descriptive statistics of this variable are presented in Figure 2. The interest rate of loans 
starts at a level around 14% in the early nineties and goes down to 5%, just before Spain 
joined the Euro zone. In the years 2000’s, the interest continued to decline with a lower value 
slightly above 3%, in year 2005, and rose again in 2006 and 2007. The introduction of the 
Euro sharply decreased the official interest rate for all banks in the Monetary Union (from 8%, 
which was the stable official interest rate of Bank of Spain in years 1993-1997, to 4.15% in 
1998. After 1998, the average official interest rate in the Euro-system decreased to 3.01%). 
The linear and the weighted averages of interest rates across banks are very close 
along the whole period, and also close the median of the year distribution (Figure 2A). 
However, there is evidence that small banks charge higher interest rate on loans than large 
banks, since the linear mean is slightly higher than the weighted one. 
The coefficient of variation of the interest rates of loans shows a time increasing 
trend, suggesting a relative divergence in the interest rates of loans among banks over time 
(Figure 2B). The divergence across interest rates increases to a level above the trend in the 
years of lower average interest rates (end of the period), maybe because banks change their 
commercial policy increasing product differentiation as a way of softening competition and 
maintaining relative profit margins. 
                                                                          
10. Figure 1B does not include foreign branches, since they are not obliged to provide information on regulatory capital 
to the Bank of Spain, since the capital requirements must be fulfilled by the consolidated group they belong to at their 
corresponding home country. Also, and in order to avoid the effect of outliers, the computation of the average of the 
solvency ratios has been carried out winsorizing the variable at 5%. 
11. Gropp and Heider (2010) specifically focused to answer whether capital requirements are a first determinant of 
banks’ capital structure. 
12. Regulatory requirements on the solvency ratio for the Spanish banks do not have to be fulfilled by individual banks 
but by the consolidated financial group they belong to. However, we are able to construct and use the individual (i.e. 
non-consolidated) solvency ratios because individual banks provide information on their risk weighted assets and on 
their capital instruments (which is latter aggregated to determine the consolidated capital ratio). We choose to use these 
individual ratios since they may contain more information of the behavior of individual banks than the common 
consolidated solvency ratio, if individual banks were relatively autonomous in their operating activity. 
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3.3 Explanatory and control variables 
One of the hypotheses to be tested is that the equity capital of banks is sensitive to the 
evolution of profits as a source of retained earnings (equation (3)). We measure the 
Profitability of banks with the variable return on assets, ROA, calculated as the ratio of net 
profits over total assets (lagged one period).  
Below, we briefly describe the control variables included in model (3) on the 
determinants of the equity capital ratio. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. 
Growth opportunities. It can be expected that banks with higher growth 
opportunities will tend to be less leveraged than non-growing banks because higher levels of 
equity capital put high growing banks in a better position to grasp the opportunities as they 
appear (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The variable commonly used in the literature to capture 
growth opportunities has been the market-to-book ratio, but many banks in our sample are 
not listed in the stock market and, thus, there is no information of this variable  
(in particular, none of the saving banks is listed13). As an alternative, we propose to capture 
the bank’s growth opportunities with a productivity measure. The bank-level productivity 
measure is taken from Martin-Oliver, Ruano and Salas-Fumás (2011). It is estimated as the 
total factor productivity parameter of the bank in year t-1. Banks with higher productivity 
parameter can be considered in a better position to invest and growth (Hopenhayn, 1992).  
Loan Loss provisions (LLP). Regulation obliges banks in Spain to set provisions in 
periods of high credit growth to compensate for expected future losses in periods of low 
growth (anti-cyclical provisions). We use the variable LLP/Assets as explanatory of the 
capital ratio to account for the cyclical conditions of the economy and the possibility of banks 
using provisions to smooth profits and dividends over time. The expected sign of the 
coefficient of this variable is undetermined.  
Business Risk. In general, it can be expected that equity capital will be higher in 
riskier than in safer banks, as a way of reducing the expected cost of bankruptcy or financial 
distress. A commonly used variable to measure the risk of the firm is the volatility of the stock 
price returns (Gropp and Heider, 2006; Flannery and Rangan, 2008). Since many of our 
banks are not listed, this measure of risk is not available for us. As an alternative, we consider 
the ratio of the risk-weighted assets over total assets, RWA/Assets. Riskier banks will have 
to increase regulatory capital to meet the minimum requirements in the capital ratio. However, 
they can do so increasing equity or increasing debt-like capital instruments. For this reason, it 
is recommendable to add the solvency ratio of the bank as an additional control variable.  
Solvency. The solvency of the bank is measured by its regulatory capital relative to 
the risk weighted assets, referred to as solvency ratio. Both, the regulatory capital and the 
risk-weighted assets are computed according to Basel I. Banks with lower values of  
the solvency coefficient in t-1 might be eager to raise the weight of their regulatory capital. If the 
response consists on issuing new capital or retain more profits (more core capital), we should 
expect a positive sign between solvency and capital ratios. However, if they were to boost the 
Tier 2 capital (limited in Basel III) that consists in debt like capital (subordinated debt, general 
provisions and revaluation reserves), the increment in this supplementary capital could 
                                                                          
13. Savings banks represent half of the number banks in the sample in 2007. 
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decrease the equity capital ratio. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient for this explanatory 
variable can inform about the preferred choice of banks to fulfil the capital regulation, equity or 
debt like capital. 
Size. The size of the bank is measured by the total assets in t-1 (at constant prices 
of 1992), expressed in logs, ln Assets. Larger banks can have better (and cheaper) access to 
financial markets and they could operate with lower capital ratios since, if more capital was 
needed, they could respond issuing new shares. Alternatively, the larger size could be tied to 
more complex balance sheets, which are optimally financed with a larger proportion of equity 
capital. Therefore, we do not have any expectation for the sign of the coefficient. 
The second hypothesis to be tested is that the interest rate of bank loans is sensitive 
to the level of equity capital in the steady state situation. Therefore, the main explanatory 
variable of interest in model (4) is the equity capital ratio, KE.  
The interest rate of loans will be determined by a mark up on the marginal cost of 
lending. The marginal cost includes the operating and the financial cost of the bank. Interest 
rates of loans will evolve over time as a result of changes in the official interest rate, the same 
for all banks, so we will use time dummy variables to control for it. The cost of funds is also 
expected to vary with the risk of the bank, so we use the variables Loan Loss provisions 
(LLP), RWA/Assets and Solvency ratio, as control variables in model (4). We assume that 
the marginal operating cost of banks can be different for banks with different productive 
efficiency and/or costs of inputs. Thus, we include as additional control variables in the 
interest rate equation Productivity and Salary. The measure of banks’ productivity was 
defined above. The variable salary is calculated as the ratio of personal expenses over the 
total number of bank employees. It can be expected that more efficient banks will have lower 
marginal operating costs and, therefore, will charge lower interest rates on loans than less 
efficient ones. The effect of salaries in the interest rate is undetermined, since higher salaries 
can be interpreted as higher operating costs or as higher quality of the labour services.  
The average interest of loans can also vary across banks due to differences in the 
composition effects of the loan portfolio and / or differences in the sources of funds with 
which loans are financed. One relevant feature of the Spanish banking industry during the 
period of study has been the extraordinary expansion on mortgage loans, financed with  
the issue of mortgage-backed securities. So, we add as control variables of the interest  
rate equation either the proportion of mortgages over total loans, Mortgages, or 
Securitization, equal to the ratio of mortgage-backed securities over total assets of the bank.  
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Regression approach  
Equity capital 
The empirical formulation of model (3) with all the explanatory variables, including the control 
ones is formulated as follows:  
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We include time dummy variables (t) and banks’ fixed effects (ηi), the latter to 
control for unobservable heterogeneity that might bias the estimate of lambda (underestimate 
speed of adjustment (Lemmon et al. 2008, Gropp and Heider, 2010)). 
The estimation is performed considering the variables Productivity and (equity) capital 
ratio as endogenous so, their values are instrumented. The instruments used are, for a bank i, 
the average productivity and the average capital ratios of the rest of banks different to i. This 
kind of instruments is used in Berry et al (1995) to estimate demand functions. Productivity 
studies have shown that the amount of intermediate inputs consumed by firms is also 
expected to be correlated with the level of productivity (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Thus, we 
use the expenditures in office supplies by each bank as an instrument of the productivity 
variable. The model has been estimated using the two-step instrumental variables. Table 2 
reports the results of the estimation. 
Column I of Table 2 shows the results of the estimation for the basic model. The 
other columns present robustness and complementary results. The lagged equity capital 
variable has a positive and significant estimated coefficient. This supports that banks 
gradually approach to the target equity capital ratio. The estimated coefficient of this 
variable is close to 0.6, which implies a speed of adjustment, λ, in the capital ratio equal to 
0.4 (1-0.6), from (3) and (6). Therefore, on average Spanish banks contribute every year in 
40% to close the gap between the current and the target capital ratio. This estimation is 
line with the speed of adjustment obtained in empirical studies with data from US banks 
(Berrospide and Edge, 2011).  
The coefficient associated to the lagged profitability variable (ROA), as a proxy of 
retained earnings, is also positive and significant. This result is consistent with the 
prediction of the pecking order theory, which predicts that retained earnings are preferred 
to new shares issues as a source of equity capital. The long term marginal contribution  
of ROA to the target equity capital ratio is 0.375 (0.15/0.40). This means that a bank with a 
ROA one standard deviation above the average ROA of the industry will have a permanent 
equity capital ratio higher than banks with the average industry ROA. The estimated 
coefficient of the variable RWA/Assets is negative and marginally statistically significant, 
that is, there is no evidence that the equity capital ratio increases with the risk profile of the 
bank. The coefficient of the Assets of the bank is not statistically significant, which means 
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that the size of the bank does not affect the choice of the target equity capital ratio14. The 
estimated coefficient for the rest of explanatory variables, Productivity, Solvency and 
LLP/Assets are all not statistically significant.  
The banks’ fixed effects variables have an important contribution to the explanatory 
power of the model indicating that there are unobserved bank-specific variables that 
determine in an important way the target equity capital ratio of banks. The estimated 
coefficients for the time dummy variables (not reported) are positive and significant in 1994 
and 1995 and negative and significant from 2005 onwards. This result suggests that the Euro 
brought conditions (financial stability, lower expected costs of financial distress) for a lower 
target in the equity capital ratio of banks, compared with the pre Euro period15. 
The estimations of Column II and Column III are for robustness purposes. In column 
II, we change the instruments of the lagged equity capital ratio. Here, we consider the lagged 
values of the Solvency ratio and the RWA/Assets ratio and we exclude them from list of the 
explanatory variables. The basic results remain unchanged. The estimated coefficient of  
the lagged ROA variable continues positive and significant (although now only at 10%). In 
column III, the robustness exercise consists in lagging the explanatory variables Solvency and 
RWA/Assets variables two periods (instead of one) so that they are not contemporary with the 
lagged equity ratio. In this estimation, the estimated coefficient of the lagged ROA is not 
longer statistically significant, but the coefficient of lagged Productivity turns out to be 
statistically significant. This result might be explained by the high correlation that is expected 
between productivity and profits16. 
Finally, the estimation reported in column IV is the same than the estimation in 
column I but the bank dummy variables are replaced by another group of dummy variables 
that capture a list characteristics of the banks, such as size17 (small, medium and large 
(omitted)), ownership (saving banks, foreign branches and commercial banks (omitted)) and 
geographic market scope18 (local, regional and national (omitted)). The estimated coefficient 
for the lagged equity capital ratio is much larger than in the estimations with banks’ fixed 
effects, confirming the bias in the estimation of the cost of adjustment coefficient of the model 
when not controlling for unobservable characteristics of the banks. Foreign branches of banks 
and small banks have a lower target equity capital ratio than national banks and lower than 
large banks, respectively.  
Interest rates of loans 
This section presents the results of the econometric estimation of model (4) on the 
determinants of the interest rate of loans charged by banks. Our main interest is in testing 
                                                                          
14. The results on the relationship between size of the bank and capital ratios are mixed in the literature. Berrospide and 
Edge (2011) find a positive and significant effect of size on capital ratios. Contrarily, Flannery and Rangan (2008)  
and Berger et al (2008) find a negative and significant effect.  
15. Kashyap et al (2010) report an increase in the capital ratio of US banks from 6% to 11% in the period 1990-2009.  
16. Another robustness result, not reported is the estimation of the models with equity capital ratios calculated at book 
values instead of the capital ratios at constant prices used in the estimations of Table 2. With accounting values the 
speed of adjustment in the capital ratio is slightly lower, 0.38, and the estimated coefficient of the ROA variable larger, 
0.21, and more statistically significant. Therefore the main conclusions about the relevance of the pecking order theory in 
the capital adjustment decision of banks remain unchanged.   
17. Banks are defined as Large banks if they are between the 66th and 100th  percentliles of the distribution of total 
assets, Small banks if they are between 1th and 33th percentiles and the rest of banks are classified as Medium banks. 
18. Banks are classified according to the geographical scope of their business as National (37% of deposit 
share in 2002), when they have branches in 90% of the 50 Spanish provinces. Local (16% of deposit share in 2002), 
when the bank concentrates 90% of the branches in a single province, and Regional, all the rest. 
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whether banks with higher equity capital charge higher interest to their granted loans and if 
the magnitude of the effect is in line with the predictions from the Modigliany-Miller theorem. 
The full econometric formulation of the model to be estimated, including the control 
variables, is the following, 
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We include time dummy variables (t) and, to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity, banks’ fixed effects (ηi). We use the same instruments for Productivity and 
(equity) Capital ratio as in the equity capital equation. Additionally, productivity is instrumented 
with the expenditures in office supplies by each bank (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). The 
model has been estimated using the two-step instrumental variables. Table 3 reports  
the results of the estimation. 
The estimation reported in column I, includes the equity capital ratio as the only 
explanatory variable, in addition to time and banks’ fixed effects. The estimated 
coefficient of the capital ratio variable is 0.047 significant at the 1% level. This value 
implies that an increase of one percentage point in the banks’ equity capital ratio is 
translated into an increment of 4.7 basis points in the interest rate to bank loans. This 
estimate is in line with the calibration of the marginal effect of equity capital on the 
interest rate of loans obtained by Kashyap et al (2010), in the context of USA’s financial 
markets and tax institutions (2.5 to 4.5 basis points).  
The estimation presented in column II coincides with the empirical model in 
equation (7). The estimated coefficient of the equity capital ratio continues positive and 
significant although the estimated value is now 0.037. Two control variables, LLP/Assets 
and Securitization/Assets have statistically significant coefficients (with positive and 
negative signs, respectively). Thus, banks with higher loan loss provisions (i.e. banks  
with riskier loans) charge higher interest rates and securitization appears to reduce the 
interest rate of bank loans. Since securitization involves mortgage loans which are less  
risky than non-mortgage ones, it is unclear whether the negative coefficient of the 
Securitization/Assets variable responds to the securitization process itself or it just reflects 
the expected lower interest in more secure loans.  
To clarify this issue and for robustness purposes we report estimations in column III 
that replaces the variable Securitization/Assets by the variable Mortgage/Assets. The 
estimation results are practically the same than those discussed in column II although, 
RWA/Assets has a positive and significant coefficient. In IV, the Mortgage/Assets variable has, 
as in col III, a negative and significant coefficient but the coefficient of Securities/Assets is not 
statistically significant. Finally, we can conclude that interest rates are lower for safer 
mortgage loans, but securitization does not have per se any effect on the interest rates. 
Banks price risk in the interest of loans: safer (mortgage) loans are charged with a lower 
interest rate, while riskier one (higher loan loss provisions ratio and higher risk-weighted ratio) 
are charged with higher interest rate. 
Finally, the specification reported in column V replaces bank dummy variables by 
banks’ characteristics. We find that foreign branches charge, on average, lower interest rates 
on loans than national banks and that small banks charge higher interest rates than larger 
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banks. On the other hand, national banks charge higher interests on loans, on average, than 
regional and local banks. 
In all the estimations, the coefficients of the time dummy variables (not reported) 
show the decreasing time trend anticipated by the descriptive information from Figure 3A. In 
years 2004 and 2005 the coefficients of the time dummies reach the highest absolute value, 
being the interest rates on average 7.7 percentage points lower than in 1993, controlling for 
the rest of explanatory variables. 
The econometric analysis just presented provides empirical evidence that the level of 
profits of banks conditions the path towards the long run equilibrium equity capital ratio 
(pecking order theory). It also supports the view that higher equity capital has a marginal 
effect in the cost of credit in the line predicted by the corporate tax gap between equity and 
debt (Modigliani and Miller theorem with taxes). Now we turn to study the effect of a change 
of the capital ratio on the demand of loans. 
4.2 The capital ratio and the demand of loans and interest rate: A simulation 
exercise.  
This section examines the effect of equity capital regulation on the aggregate bank credit, 
taking into account competition among individual banks and the competition between bank 
credit and other sources of finance (i.e., bonds or retained earnings). The analysis is based in 
a simulation exercise that relies on the parameterized model of the Spanish banking industry 
proposed and estimated by Martín-Oliver (2010). The estimated parameters include the 
elasticity of the demand of bank loans to the interest rate for the representative bank, which is 
equal to -4.134; and the elasticity of the aggregate demand of bank loans to a general 
change in the interest rates set by all the banks, which is smaller and equal to -1.176. This 
implies that the price-elasticity is higher at the bank level than at the aggregate level. The 
reason can be explained as follows: when one bank increases the interest rate of loans, 
potential borrowers can go to the other banks since the competing banks offer imperfect 
substitute loans. When all banks raise the interest rate simultaneously due to, for example, an 
external shock common to all of them, the substitution is between bank loans and the 
alternative sources of finance. Then, the substitutability among loans from different banks will 
be higher than the substitutability among bank loans and other sources of finance.  
The simulation exercise with the complete parameterized model proceeds as follows. 
We fix the values of the exogenous variables of the model at their average values for the 
Spanish economy during the period 1997-2003, according to Martín-Oliver (2010)19. Also, 
and consistently with the findings in Driscoll (2004) and Berrospide et al. (2011), we assume 
that the total assets and liabilities of the economy (which include bank loans and deposits) 
grow at the same rate as the GDP. Then, we simulate the effect of a tougher regulation of 
capital requirements. To do so, we consider that demanding a higher equity capital ratio to 
banks increases the weighted average cost of funds in a range between 0bp and 25bp. This 
range is the same that results from an increment in the equity capital ratio between 0 and 5 to 
8 percentage points in the table of values elaborated by Kashyap et al (2010). Using the 
equilibrium conditions of the model, we are able to solve for the endogenous variables and 
obtain their optimal values for an individual bank.  
                                                                          
19. Interbank interest rate (rib): 4.5%; GDP growth (GDPG):3%; Cost of Equity (rE=12%); Physical Capital per Branch (kb): 
358; Salary per worker (w): 16; risk premium (rp ): 1.2%.  
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The evolution of the simulated equilibrium interest rates resulting from the marginal 
increments in the cost of funds are shown in Figure 3.1. A summary of the changes in some 
selected variables resulting from an increment of the cost of funds of 25 basis points is 
presented in Table 4. The equilibrium interest rate of loans increases from 7.53% to 7.87%, 
that is, a raise of 34 basis points (4.38 %). If we had predicted the change in the interest rates 
of loans using the mark-up resulting from the estimated price elasticity of -4.134, then the 
increment of 25 basic points in the cost of funds would imply a 33 basis points increase in  
the interest rate of loans (from equation (5): 4.134 /(4.134-1))x25 = 33), very close to the 34 
basis points obtained with the simulation.  
The simulated increment of 34 basis points in the interest rate of loans that results 
from the increment in 25 basis points in the weighted cost of funds for banks is also 
consistent with the increment predicted from the econometric results of Table 3, which  
give the marginal effect of a higher equity capital ratio on the interest rate. The way to 
reconcile the results is by keeping in mind that the increment in the cost of funds comes 
from a higher equity capital ratio. Going back to the calibration results of Kashyap et al 
(2010), an increment in the cost of funds of 25 basis points could be the consequence of 
an increment in the equity ratio of 5 to 8 percentage points. Taking into account the 
estimated coefficient of the equity capital ratio of 0.042 in Table 2, a 5 to 8 percentage 
points of increase in the equity ratio implies an increment in the interest rate of loans 
between 21 (5x4.2) and 33.6 (8x4.2) basis points. 
The summary of simulated equilibrium values in Table 4 includes other competitive 
decision variables of banks Branches and Advertising capital, as well as the Total Bank Loans 
also in the old and new equilibrium (see also Figure 3). In equilibrium, an increment in the cost 
of funds of 25 basis points implies that the number of branches increases in 0.29% and the 
advertising capital increases in 1.34%, relative to the base scenario. The aggregate demand 
of bank loans in the new equilibrium solution (cost of funds 25 basis points higher) decreases 
in 4.17% (from 81.9% to 78.8%) of the total financial resources of the economy. This means 
that the increase in the interest rate of loans in the new equilibrium induces bank borrowers to 
substitute bank loans for other sources of funds to finance their investments. As the higher 
requirements of equity capital apply to all banks, all of them experience the increment in the 
cost of funds resulting from the new regulatory requirements. For this reason, a generalized 
higher cost of funds does not change the market share of individual banks but it changes the 
aggregate market share of loans in the total funds available to finance investment. 
It is of interest to compare the simulated change in the aggregate demand of bank 
loans with the predicted value, taking into account the change in interest rate and the 
estimated elasticity of the aggregate demand of bank equal to -1.176. The 25 basis points 
increment in the cost of funds implies an increment in interest rate of loans of 4.38%, 
according to the simulation results reported in Table 4. Then, the predicted decrease in the 
aggregate demand of loans from the estimated price elasticity would be equal to -5.15% 
(4.38 x (-1.176)). This value is higher, in absolute terms, than the absolute value of 4.38% 
obtained in the simulation exercise. The difference between the two estimates can be 
explained by the increment in advertising capital and branches that occurs at the same time 
that the increment in the interest in deposits, since higher advertising capital and more 
branches have a positive effect in the demand of loans that compensates, in part, the 
negative effect of the higher interest rate.  
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5 Conclusions 
This paper aims to evaluate the potential costs of demanding more equity in the regulatory 
capital of banks, providing empirical evidence from Spanish banks on how they adjust their 
equity capital ratios and on the long-run relationship between equity capital and the cost  
of and demand for bank credit. The analysis presented in the paper supports the relevance of 
the methodological distinction between the flow and the stock costs of equity capital 
regulation made by Kashyap et al. (2010). Each cost corresponds to a different market 
disturbance: information asymmetries, in the case of the flow cost, and different taxation of 
the cost of debt and equity, in the case of the stock cost. Therefore, the minimising of these 
costs will require different policy responses.   
The evidence on potential flow costs provided by the paper is that Spanish banks 
gradually adjust their equity capital ratio and that the magnitude of the changes to adapt the 
capital ratios to the desired levels is positively associated with the profitability of banks. This 
suggests that retained earnings are preferred to new share issues as a source of equity.  
The transition period for fully complying with the new equity requirements set by regulations ( 
as in Basel III) may have the purpose of reducing such costs by making it easier for banks to 
raise additional capital by gradual retaining of earnings instead of by issuing new shares.  
The second piece of empirical evidence in the paper is that banks translate the 
higher cost of equity capital to lending rates and that the magnitude of this pass-through is 
compatible with what may be expected under the Modigliani and Miller theorem in the 
presence of taxes. In particular, Spanish banks raise their lending rates by 4.2 basis points for 
each percentage point by which the equity capital ratio is raised (the prediction from a pure 
tax effect would be 3.5 basis points in the period of study since the corporate tax rate during 
this period was 35%). Use of the Modigliani-Miller theorem with taxes in the evaluation of the 
long-term effects of higher equity capital reduces the uncertainty about the magnitude of  
the costs and sets an upper bound to this magnitude.  
The upper bound to the expected increase in the cost of bank loans resulting from 
higher equity capital regulation is confirmed by the results of a simulation exercise based on 
a calibrated model of the Spanish banking industry that provides the equilibrium solutions 
for prices, quantities and management variables (such as advertising expenditure and 
branches), in response to a change in the cost of funds for banks. The bound, however, 
may be lower than that found in the econometric estimates because the simulation  
results suggest that, in addition to their lending rates, banks adjust other competitive 
variables (advertising expenditure, number of branches, etc.). The simulation exercise also 
reveals the contraction in the demand for bank credit that would result from the higher 
lending rates. We estimate that a regulatory increase of five percentage points in the equity 
capital ratio of banks would result in a contraction of credit for the whole economy of 
around 4%, i.e. the contraction in the stock of bank credit per percentage point of increase 
in the equity capital ratio would be equal to around 0.8 percentage points. This figure 
cannot be interpreted as the magnitude of the contraction in the total amount of funds 
available for financing investment and, therefore, as a contraction in investment itself, since 
bank credit may be substituted by other sources of finance.  
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The empirical analysis of the determinants of the equity capital ratio and Spanish 
bank lending rates provides additional results of interest. We find that the equity capital ratio 
of Spanish banks has been lower on average since the adoption of the euro. Our 
interpretation is that Spanish banks have valued the euro’s contribution to financial stability 
positively (lower expected costs of financial distress) and, for this reason, have modified their 
target equity capital ratio to a lower value than in the pre-euro period. We also find that small 
banks maintain permanently higher equity capital ratios and charge higher lending rates than 
large banks (although the economic relevance of the difference is small). Therefore, during the 
period of study there is no evidence of full convergence of equity capital ratios and interest 
rates among banks in Spain. Small banks manage to be competitive and survive in a context 
of lower net interest margins, resulting from the easier financial conditions, by charging higher 
interest rates for their credit to compensate for the fact that their cost of funds is higher than 
that of large banks20.  
The social costs of the new regulatory regime are not the only relevant aspect of the 
capital regulation of banks. Another important consideration is the cost for bank shareholders 
of higher equity capital standards and, therefore, of lower leverage of banks’ equity capital 
relative to the regime before Basel III. Suppose that the shareholders of banks collect all or a 
substantial part of the corporate tax benefits of debt versus equity finance. Ceteris paribus, 
the permanent substitution of one euro of equity for one euro of debt in the total regulatory 
capital of a bank involves an increase in the value of the bank equal, in present value terms, to 
the tax rate u. If all the gain goes to the shareholders, the return per unit of equity as a 
function of the debt to equity ratio L is, in present value terms, equal to Lu. This means that  
a debt to equity ratio of 4 in the current Basel II regulation of capital (2 percentage points of 
equity in the total regulatory capital ratio of 8%) implies a tax return for the shareholders  
of banks, in present value terms, of 120% if the tax rate is 30%. If Basel III regulation lowers 
the leverage ratio within the regulatory capital to 1/3, the tax-return goes down to only 10%. 
Even if shareholders of banks obtain only a fraction of these tax gains from leverage, 
because competition forces them to share the gains with the banks’ customers, the numbers 
are high enough to explain the concerns of banks in relation to a capital regulation that limits 
the leverage ratio within the regulatory capital ratio for banks much more than before. In any 
case, exploration of the potential private costs of the new bank capital regulation is an issue 
for future research. 
 
                                                                          
20. Kashyap et al. (2010) justify their evidence of higher equity capital and higher lending rates for small banks in the 
United States by saying that small banks probably are more active in relational banking than large ones and, for this 
reason, they grant loans in a market environment that allows for more personification and differentiation of the activity. 
We find no evidence of differences in the equity capital ratio and the average interest rate of loans between commercial 
and saving banks.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in empirical models. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Determinants of the equity capital ratios of banks 
The estimates of this table correspond to the estimation of Equation (6) controlling for time 
effects and clustering standard errors at the bank level. The sample period is 1992-2007. 
Specifications (I), (II) and (III) include bank fixed effects whereas Specification (IV) includes 
dummy variables that identify savings bank, foreign branches, small/medium-size banks 
(default: big banks) and regional and local banks (default: banks operating nationwide). 
Columns below (I) present the Coefficient and Standard Errors (S.E.) for the basic 
specification, (II) instruments the capital ratio with the Solvency coefficient and the ratio of Risk 
Weighted Assets with respect to Assets (RWA/Assets); (III) substitutes the first lag of the 
variables Solvency and RWA/Assets by the second lag of these variables and (IV) substitutes 
bank fix-effects by dummies identifying bank characteristics. Asterisks refer to significance 
levels: (***) significant at 1%; (**) significant at 5%; (*) significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mean
Weighted 
Avg.
Std.Dev. 10th Perc. 25th Perc. 50th Perc. 75th Perc. 90th Perc.
Capital Ratio (%) 9.07 5.05 6.46 3.41 5.21 7.44 10.54 16.16
Loan Interest Rate (%) 7.39 5.52 3.46 3.70 4.65 6.08 10.07 12.77
Productivity 2,137 3,143 1,150 974 1,313 1,840 2,711 3,678
ROA 0.67 0.87 3.16 0.03 0.45 0.89 1.30 1.91
LLP/Assets (%) 0.36 0.30 0.37 0.01 0.13 0.29 0.49 0.75
Salaries (th€ 1992) 35.24 36.80 9.01 28.23 30.00 32.95 37.92 43.58
Securitization/Assets (%) 3.57 8.59 6.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.80 14.16
Mortgages / Assets (%) 41.17 48.27 22.44 3.47 24.11 45.59 59.08 67.67
Solvency Coeff (%) 14.63 11.70 8.27 8.93 10.17 12.19 16.61 24.74
RWA/Assets (%) 57.17 69.99 23.69 22.49 43.10 58.44 75.75 87.24
Assets (m€ 1992) 7,142 60,100 18,830 270 725 2,046 5,421 13,480
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
     Capital ratio t-1 0.596 *** 0.066 0.568 ** 0.223 0.535 *** 0.068 0.883 *** 0.031
     ln Productivity  t-1 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.034 0.011 ** 0.005 0.006 ** 0.003
     ROA t-1 0.153 ** 0.069 0.144 * 0.074 ‐0.018 0.105 0.100 0.063
    LLP/Assets t-1 0.309 0.424 ‐0.167 0.478 0.575 0.369 0.385 0.520
    Solvency Coeff t-1 ‐0.008 0.025 0.022 0.023 ‐0.022 0.019
    RWA/Assets t-1 ‐0.017 * 0.009 ‐0.019 * 0.010 ‐0.008 * 0.005
    ln Assets t-1 ‐0.005 0.006 ‐0.008 0.008 ‐0.005 0.006
    Savings bank ‐0.001 0.002
    Foreign Branch ‐0.014 *** 0.005
    Small Size 0.012 *** 0.003
    Medium Size 0.003 ** 0.001
    Regional Bank 0.000 0.004
    Local Bank ‐0.002 0.003
   Fixed Effects
   Time Effects
   R2  (%)
   N Observations
YES NO
I II III IV
YES YES YES YES
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
YES YES
85.09 84.74 86.20 80.09
1643 1643 1506 1643
(t e  
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Table 3. Determinants of the interest rate of bank loans.  
The estimates of this table correspond to the estimation of Equation (7) controlling for time 
effects; the capital ratio and productivity of each bank are instrumented with its expenditures 
of office stationary and with the average of these variables for the rest of competing banks. 
We cluster standard errors at the bank level. The sample period is 1992-2007. Specifications 
(I), (II), (III) and (IV) include bank fixed effects whereas Specification (V) includes dummy 
variables that identify savings bank, foreign branches, small/medium-size banks (default: big 
banks) and regional and local banks (default: banks operating nationwide). Specification (III) 
substitutes the ratio Securitization/Assets by the ratio Mortgages/Assets and specification (IV) 
includes both of them at the same time For each specification, we show the Coefficient and 
Standard Errors (S.E.). Asterisks refer to significance levels: (***) significant at 1%; (**) 
significant at 5%; (*) significant at 1%.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
    Capital Ratio 0.047 *** 0.155 0.037 ** 0.018 0.042 ** 0.017 0.042 ** 0.017 0.022 * 0.013
    ln Productivity t-1 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 ‐0.001 0.002
    Salaries (th€ 1992) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
    Securitization/Assets ‐0.031 *** 0.007 ‐0.005 0.006 ‐0.034 *** 0.007
    Mortgages / Assets ‐0.069 *** 0.008 ‐0.069 *** 0.008
    LLP/Assets 0.523 *** 0.162 0.508 *** 0.152 0.502 *** 0.153 1.201 *** 0.153
    Solvency Coeff ‐0.005 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.011 ‐0.002 0.010
    RWA/Assets 0.000 0.004 0.010 ** 0.004 0.010 ** 0.004 0.000 0.002
    ln Assets (th€ 1992) ‐0.002 0.002 ‐0.002 0.002 ‐0.002 0.002
    Savings bank 0.000 0.001
    Foreign Branch ‐0.013 *** 0.004
    Small Size 0.009 *** 0.001
    Medium Size 0.003 *** 0.001
    Regional Bank ‐0.007 *** 0.002
    Local Bank ‐0.006 *** 0.002
   Fixed Effects
   Time Effects
   R 2  (%)
   N. Observations
89.97
1643
IV
Coefficient
yes
yes
91.49
1643
yes
yes
1643
yes
91.5090.33
I
Coefficient
yes
yes
Coefficient
yes
II III V
Coefficient
1643
80.75
no
yes
1643
Coefficient
(t e )
e
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Table 4. Simulated equilibrium values for selected variables in a base scenario of the 
Spanish banking industry and in a new scenario with 25 basis points higher 
weighted cost of capital for banks. 
This table shows the results from the simulation of a 25 bp increase in the weighted cost of 
capital of banks using the partial equilibrium model of banking competition presented in 
Section 5. The first column refers to the level of the weighted cost of capital simulated in the 
exercise and the last row shows the growth rate of each variable due to the increment in the 
weighted cost of capital. From the 2nd to the 4th column, we present the values of the loan 
interest rate, branches and advertising of a bank that maintains the market share of 1% of the 
financing sources of the economy. Finally, the last column shows the volume of total loans 
granted by banks before and after the change in the cost of capital. 
 
 
 
 
All the variables are expressed either in percentage points (when specified) or in 
thousands of constant euros of 1992. 
  
Loan interest rate 
(%)
N.Branches Advertising
4.50 7.53 1,532 82,735 236,171,520
4.75 7.87 1,536 83,846 226,328,376
Growth Rate (%)
5.56 4.38 0.29 1.34 ‐4.17
SIMULATION FOR A BANK HOLDING 1% OF MARKET SHARE
TOTAL BANK 
LOANS
Weighted 
Cost of 
Capital (%)
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Figure 1.A. Descriptive statistics of capital ratios of Spanish banks: Equity capital 
A. Average, Weighted Average and Median 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Percentiles 
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Figure 1. B Descriptive statistics of capital ratios of Spanish banks: Solvency ratio 
A. Average, Weighted Average and Median  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Percentiles  
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Figure 2. Descriptive statistics of interest rate of loans of Spanish banks 
A. Linear Average, Weighted Average and Median  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Percentiles  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
AVERAGE
WEIGHTED AVERAGE
MEDIAN
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
3%
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
STD DEVIATION
COEFF. OF VARIATION (r.h.s)
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
10th PERCENTILE 25th PERCENTILE
50th PERCENTILE 75th PERCENTILE
90th PERCENTILE
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1218 
Figure 3. Results from the simulation: Increase of 25 basic points in the weighted 
average cost of capital 
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